Introduction
The interdependence of financial institutions makes financial stability a common resource and creates considerable potential for spillovers (Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein 2011, Cecchetti and Tucker 2015) . All institutions benefit when all other institutions are healthy and, conversely, troubles at some institutions could spread to create troubles at other institutions (Allen and Gale 2007) . Financial stability is also potentially subject to free-rider problems (Kahn and Wagner 2017) . Institutions may not internalize the impacts they have on each other and so may maintain smaller solvency or liquidity buffers to protect themselves against stresses than is optimal from a systemic perspective. This concern has long been recognized and efforts to address it have underpinned requirements ranging from the minimum reserve requirements set by the New York Clearinghouse for member banks in the 1850s (Coe 1873) to the minimum capital requirements for global banks agreed to as part of the Basel capital standards (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011).
Concerns about free-riding were particularly prominent in the United States' National Banking Era in which there was a dual banking system where some banks were chartered by the national government through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (called national banks) and some banks were chartered by state authorities (called state banks). White (1983) documents how state and national banking authorities lowered capital requirements to entice banks to adopt a state versus national charter. As equity capital is important in promoting bank health and providing a buffer such that loan losses do not cause losses to bank liability holders-including other banks-allowing entry by banks with less capital might have reduced the stability of the banking system (Wheelock and Wilson 1995) .
In this paper, we examine another possible instance in which regulatory differences might have led to free riding, again with potential implications for financial stability. Reserve requirements were a prominent regulatory tool in the National Banking Era. These requirements mandated that banks hold a certain amount of cash and other liquid assets against certain liabilities in order to ensure that they had sufficient resources to meet deposit withdrawals under most circumstances (Comptroller 1863) . National banks faced a relatively strict set of requirements regarding the cash that they had to hold in proportion to their deposit base.
1 State banks also frequently faced cash reserve requirements (at least by 1900), though the severity of these rules varied. In some places, they were at least as tight as those for national banks while in other places they were notably easier. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the regulatory environment in the early 1900s, focusing in particular on reserve requirements. Section 3 discusses the data.
Section 4 presents our analysis of the cash holdings of state banks and whether their cash holdings were affected by differences in requirements and the presence of national banks.
Section 5 concludes.
The Regulatory Environment
The banking environment in the National Banking Era can most charitably be described as disjointed. One group of banks were the national banks chartered by federal agency and subject to a uniform set of standards across all states that are described in the Annual Reports of As noted earlier, some regulations between state and national banks differed notably. One such regulation, which has been discussed relatively extensively in the previous literature, is capital requirements. For instance, as of 1909, the minimum capital requirement for establishing a national bank in towns where the population did not exceed 3,000 was $25,000; while for some states a bank could be started in a similarly sized town with a minimum capital of only $10,000.
While minimum capital requirements also varied across state and national banks, they were quantity requirements rather than ratio requirements and thus served mostly as an entry barrier rather than a barrier to risk-taking. To understand how differences in regulations may have affected risk taking behavior, the regulation that we focus on in this paper is reserve requirements. The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 established reserve requirements for national banks. In the period we look at, national banks in central reserve cities (i.e., New York City, Chicago, and St Louis) were required to hold 25 percent reserve in vault cash. National banks in reserve cities (e.g., large regional centers) had to hold 25 percent reserve but only half that amount needed to be held as vault cash; the rest could be on deposit in a central reserve city national bank. The remaining "country" national banks only had to maintain a 15 percent reserve of which two-fifths needed to be held on site, while the remainder could be held on deposit at a national bank in a central reserve city or reserve city. In this paper, we focus on the portion of the reserve that needed to consist of cash.
State banks were usually, though not always, subject to a cash reserve requirement. (State banks might also have had total reserve requirements that allowed for some portion to consist of non-cash assets. As with the national banks, we focus on the portion of the requirement that needed to consist of cash.) Given our interest in whether state banks were free-riding on the cash reserves of national banks, it is helpful to classify state requirements relative to the national requirements to determine whether the state banks could have held less cash than national banks if they had desired. The state regulations and whether we classify those rules as easier, tighter, or the same as for national banks appear in Table 1 (states not included in our sample are shown in italics). In most cases-11 of the 24 states in our sample-we find that the reserve requirements imposed on the state banks were unconditionally more lenient than those imposed on national banks. The reserve requirements were the same in many states and were unconditionally tighter in a handful states. In several states, the differences between state laws and national laws depended either on the size of the city in which the bank was located or on the distribution of deposits held by banks. As an example of the former, the reserve requirement in Kansas was 5 percent of deposits held in cash for locations under 5,000 people yet 6.25 percent of deposits held in cash for more populated locations. An example of latter, the reserve requirement in Texas was 25 percent of demand deposits with at least two-fifths held as cash (i.e. 10 percent of demand deposits) yet there was no reserve requirement on time deposits. In the former case, we account for population in the analysis while in the latter case, we treat them as having the same reserve requirements as national banks. (The results are similar if we instead omit these states.)
Data
Given To create a consistent measure of cash holdings across the various states, we aggregate unique balance sheet items listed in a few state reports into more common items. For example, cash in vault, gold coin, silver coin, minor coins, checks, and reserves are merged into a single cash variable measure. We also avoid extreme outliers and potential data errors by dropping banks that had ratios of cash to assets below 2 percent. The results are generally robust to modest adjustments in this cutoff.
Analysis of cash holdings at state banks
There was a profitability incentive to minimize cash holdings. The interest rates that banks earned on their loans were reported to have averaged around 6.5 percent in the 1890s (Breckenridge 1898; James 1974) . The return on quite safe and liquid assets-balances at correspondent banks in New York City-typically earned rates of around 2 percent. Cash holdings, by contrast, earned no interest. Thus, bank shareholders had a financial incentive to, at the margin, make more loans and economize on cash holdings.
In addition to meeting cash reserve requirements, banks had to maintain sufficient cash to meet deposit withdrawals when they occurred. However, state banks may have believed that they could have obtained cash when needed from nearby banks. James, Weiman, and McAndrews (2013) note that large cities had interbank markets for cash and it is quite possible that arrangements for banks to obtain cash from each other existed in smaller towns as well. As national banks tended to be required to have more cash on hand, we expect that state banks would have been better positioned to take advantage of these markets to reduce cash holdings.
In addition, state banks may have believed that even in a crisis, they would have been able to obtain cash from national banks as the national banks would have felt it was in their own interest to keep the state banks afloat because the closure of a state bank might trigger a more widespread run. The contemporary financial press reported that such a dynamic was in place Based on these incentives, our hypothesis is that state banks will hold lower cash balances where (1) they allowed to by law and (2) where cash balances at nearby national banks were relatively ample. Both conditions matter for this hypothesis. The regulatory requirement is clearly important. In states where the reserve requirements were relatively low, banks may have held less cash, while in states where the reserve requirements were the same as or higher for the national banks, we would not expect much difference. We account for state bank requirements using a dummy variable for whether a state had relatively looser requirements. The second condition concerns the cash holdings of nearby national banks. For the cash balances of the national banks to have been sufficient to affect the behavior of the state banks, there would have to be nearby national banks of meaningful size and they would have to have sizable cash holdings. 4 We measure the importance of the local national banks using the share of total bank assets in the city that consisted of the assets of national banks and our measure of the cash holdings of national banks is the total cash of all national banks in the area divided by the total assets of those national banks (one could interpret this measure as the average cash-to-asset ratio weighted by bank size).
4 If the national banks were much smaller than the state banks, then we would not expect that the state banks would hold less cash. (If there were four banks in a town-three large state banks and one small national bank then we would not expect that those state banks would be much affected by the cash holdings of the national bank.)
Various other bank characteristics might influence cash holdings. Larger banks may benefit from having more depositors and, based on the law-of-large-numbers, have smaller net day-to-day changes in deposits as deposit withdrawals would be more likely to be offset by inflows. Consequently, larger banks might need to hold less cash. The capital position of the bank could also be important with better capitalized banks needing to hold less cash (Calomiris and Wilson 2004) . 5 Our measures of the capital position of the bank include both the ratio of net worth (capital paid in, surplus, and undivided profits) to assets and the ratio of surplus, and undivided profits to net worth. Surplus and undivided profits tended to reflect retained earnings and thus may reflect the quality of the bank's capital position.
Other location factors, besides the cash position of nearby banks, might also influence the cash holdings of the bank. For instance, areas with larger or more urban populations might have more transactions and thus higher liquidity needs. Areas with more manufacturing firms may have greater need for long-distance transactions so banks might hold a larger portion of their liquid assets as balances at other banks, as was found by Calomiris and Carlson (2017) , rather than as cash. We also control for whether the city is a reserve city, whether the city had an active clearinghouse, and the log of the number of banks nearby. As the balance sheet reports come from different times of the year, we control for whether the report was filed in the summer months (June to August) rather than toward the end of the year.
Putting these parts together, the specification we use in our regressions is:
where is the ratio of cash to assets of state bank i, ℎ , is the ratio of national bank assets to total assets in a location,
, is the ratio of total national bank cash to assets in a location, is a dummy variable that takes a value of "1" if the state bank reserve requirement was relatively looser than the national bank requirement. , is a vector of bank balance sheet controls including the logarithm of assets, the ratio of capital to assets, the ratio of surplus to capital, and the ratio of due to banks to deposits. is a vector of city-level controls, including whether the city is a reserve city and the logarithm of the number of banks in the city, and county-level Census controls from Haines (2004) including the logarithm of population, the share of the population defined living in a location of more than 2,500 people (i.e., an urban location), the logarithm of manufacturing firms. is a vector of time fixed effects.
, is the robust error term. Summary statistics for the variables in the year 1906 are in Table 2 . Those for other years are similar.
As an alternative, we also estimate equation (1) using as our dependent variable the ratio of cash in excess of the minimum amount the bank would need to satisfy its reserve requirement relative to assets. Not all states published detailed enough deposit data to calculate this ratio correctly, especially if the reserve requirement differed between demand and time deposits, so we are limited to a slightly smaller sample of states.
When conducting our analysis, we limit the sample to towns with neither too many nor too few banks. It is not clear that a state bank in a town in which the only other bank is a national bank would have the same opportunity to free ride as three state banks in a town with three national banks, even if the state banks accounted for the same share of assets in both cases. For instance, the interbank market for cash balances noted above would clearly be more limited in the town with only two banks. To implement our test, we posit that there must be at least four banks in the town for the free-riding effect to be observable and limit our analysis to cities with at least four banks. It is also possible that very heavily banked cities were different and required different cash balances of banks operating in them. Thus we exclude cities with 20 more banks. 6 We discuss sensitivity of our results to these cutoffs below.
We start by pooling all the years between 1905 and 1909 to test whether state banks displayed behavior consistent with free riding. Specifically, we are interested in testing whether national banks tended to hold more cash. To illustrate the economic effects of the laws versus the cash holdings of nearby banks, we compare banks using the effects based on the coefficients and data means from the pooled sample. The coefficients from the specification using the total cash holdings indicate that a bank in a state with reserve requirements as tight as those of the national banks and with all other covariates set at the mean would be predicted to have had a cash-toasset ratio of 5.8 percent. For comparison, a bank in a town located in a state that allowed lower reserve requirements but was the same in all other ways, would be predicted to have had a cash ratio of 5.2 percent, a noticeably lower ratio.
7
While we find evidence of free riding for some banks, there were locations where this behavior does not seem to have occurred. In unreported results, we do not find evidence of free riding among state banks in towns of two or three banks-consistent with our expectation that a critical mass of banks needed before the free riding effect occurs or is observable. Additionally, we find no evidence of free riding in the largest cities (those with 20 or more banks).
Next we examine if there is any differential behavior over time. The Panic of 1907 was a severe financial crisis that resulted in a widespread and scramble for liquidity and the suspension of convertibility of deposits to cash by clearinghouse associations across the country and a collapse of the payment system (Sprague 1910) . If state banks were free-riding before the Panic, they might have been in even more trouble during 1907. It is even possible that they changed their ways after the Panic. We, therefore, drop the year fixed effects and re-estimate equation (1) for each individual year. We conduct the analysis using total cash holdings, as that ratio is available for a larger number of states.
These results are reported in Table 4 . The coefficients on the interaction term of interest (the fraction of city assets at national banks * cash holdings of national banks * easier state reserve requirement) are consistently negative and statistically significant. There is not too much variation over time. We observe perhaps slightly less free-riding immediately after the Panic of 1907, with the estimated effect of being near national banks with more cash the smallest in 1908.
But any change in behavior appears to have been temporary as the estimated effect in 1909 is in 7 Across all state banks in the pooled sample, the average cash ratio was 5.7 percent with a standard deviation of 3.8 percentage points.
line with the estimated effect in 1905 and 1906. The incentive to free-ride seems to have been quite strong. 
Conclusion
Our paper examines the potential for some financial institutions to free-ride on the liquidity of the financial institutions. Holding cash can be costly in terms of opportunities foregone so banks may have preferred to minimize cash on their balance sheet. We find that state banks that were subject to lower cash reserve requirements and that were located near national banks where cash requirements were higher, tended to hold less cash. It is possible that that this reliance by state banks on cash holdings of national banks increased the severity of liquidity pressure during the panic of 1907. Such a dynamic was described in New York City where dependence by trust companies on the liquidity of New York Clearinghouse members increased the stresses on the clearinghouse member banks (Sprague 1908) .
The findings in this paper offer some lessons for financial stability today. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, there has been renewed interest and emphasis on liquidity requirements. For instance, large and internationally active commercial banks are now subject to a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) that stipulates that these banks must hold particular quantities of high-quality liquid assets in proportion to particular liabilities (See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2014). Prime money market funds are also subject to new liquidity rules (Securities and Exchange Commission 2016) . However our findings highlight a concern about having some parts of the financial system covered by liquidity requirements while other parts of the system are not covered. As shown in Section 4, institutions not covered by rules may believe that increased holdings of liquidity on the part of covered institutions may allow them to operate with lower liquidity holdings because they can depend on the covered institutions to supply liquidity when needed. This dynamic could increase the pressure on the covered institutions during a stress event and points to the importance of understanding the liquidity position of the financial system as a whole. 
